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totle's real merit is to be found in his insisting upon the idea of immanent teleology ; and in this direction the vice in his doctrines is due to his unfortunate attempt to make clear his meaning on the analogies of artifice and biological development. Aristotle did not fully appreciate the significance of his own formula, *ἄνθρωπος ἄνθρωπον γεννᾷ*. But if he had had our psychology and epistemological presuppositions, the idea of immanent teleology would have naturally passed into the thoroughgoing spiritual monism towards which his system really tended. In spiritual monism there is no necessity, no contingency, but only the freedom of reason, — caprice, which is the highest reason, because it contains all other reasons. Again, even if the concept and percept are functional aspects of one intellectual process, necessity and contingency do not merely register degrees in the definition of fact. On the contrary, they do relate to objective fact, just because they are categories of a *discursive* understanding. Since the world is our representation, it is essentially a describable world. Such a world is one of brute fact and rigid laws. But our world is incapable of *complete* description ; and even if it were so capable, our describable experience would not be the possession of the inner heart of reality, the truth. Only an absolute mind, a *perceptive* understanding, possesses the truth ; its experience, as being a complete experience, *is* the truth. In the life of the absolute mind free spiritual ideals alone are realized.

J. D. LOGAN.

Schopenhauer's System in its Philosophical Significance. Shaw Fellowship Lectures, 1893. (Delivered in Edinburgh University.) WILLIAM CALDWELL, M.A., D.Sc., Professor in Northwestern University (formerly Assistant to Professor, Edinburgh ; Instructor, Cornell and Chicago Universities). Edinburgh and London, Blackwood ; New York, Scribners, 1896. — 8vo, pp. xviii + 538, and Index.

The nature of this book seems to be fairly well set forth in the preface. The book is substantially the outcome of the public lectures delivered by the author in the Logic class-room of the University of Edinburgh in the months of October and November, 1893, at the close of his tenure of the Shaw Fellowship, — an important fellowship in Scotland, which entails the obligation of public lectures, understood to be eventually published. Other volumes that are outcomes of the Shaw Lectures are : Adamson's *Philosophy of Kant* (1879) ; Sorley's *Ethics of Naturalism* (1885) ; Mackenzie's *Introduction to Social Philosophy* (1890 ; 2d edition, 1895).

The matter is no longer in the lecture form, but in the shape of several continuous philosophical essays, having a natural and a logical connection with each other and with the book as a whole. Taken together, they represent a unified series of attempts to suggest the significance of Schopenhauer's thought as an organic whole. The author has been, before all things, concerned to estimate the positive significance of Schopenhauer's philosophy for modern thought and for the conduct of to-day. After having

read Schopenhauer for several years, and a great deal that has been written on Schopenhauer, he felt that the man's positive philosophy had not yet been sufficiently appreciated by the reading and thinking public. He tries in his volume to connect Schopenhauer with philosophy and with human nature. The roots of Schopenhauer's philosophy in epistemology and idealism and nineteenth-century science and thought, and its dogmatic teaching in ethics, art, religion, and metaphysics are set forth, always with abundant illustration and quotation from Schopenhauer himself. And, more than this, the book ventures on a line of positive contribution to philosophy on the strength of Schopenhauer. Hartmann is considered as far as seemed necessary. Footnotes and index and references enable the student to use the book to advantage. The writer used, too, material he partly published in *Mind*, and partly used as lectures in the Sage School of Philosophy at Cornell.

AUTHOR.

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society for the Systematic Study of Philosophy. Vol. III. No. 2. London, Williams & Norgate, 1896.
— pp. 135.

The proceedings of the Aristotelian Society derive their chief interest from the fact, that we naturally look to them for indications of the drift of thought among systematic students of philosophy in England, and our confidence in them as the mirror of philosophic tendency is not seriously shaken by the evidence of presidential direction afforded in the committee's report and list of suitable papers. For though the committee may propose, we may suspect it will have to accept what its contributors are disposed to offer. And so instead of complaining that "there is little Logic and almost nothing on the subject of Ethics or of Aesthetic, Social, or Religious Philosophy" offered, let us rather regard the relative popularity of subjects as indicative of the lines of investigation which at the moment seem most feasible and attractive. Possibly, also, the tone of the Society, and the personality of its president, may have something to do with the topics chosen and avoided. It is conceivable, *e.g.*, that Mr. Bosanquet's fame may deter all but the most audacious from attacking a subject like logic, on which he holds such strong and elaborate convictions; and, to judge by the tone of the papers, the air of the Society is probably a little too dry to be expected to develop any warmth of ethical, aesthetical, or religious thought. The Aristotelian Society clearly is not likely to do any missionary work on behalf of philosophy. Over its papers broods an atmosphere of academic aloofness; they are pervaded by the nervous horror of incisive statement and the drowsy hesitancy about coming to close quarters with a question, which are characteristic of reflective men who have never been compelled to action nor been stinted for time as 'spectators of all time and existence.'

Turning to the contents of the present number (which in consequence of the new arrangement with *Mind* will presumably be the last), we come first